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Abstract
Background: Although human beings regularly experience fictional worlds through activities such as reading novels and
watching movies, little is known about what mechanisms underlie our implicit knowledge of the distinction between reality
and fiction. The first neuroimaging study to address this issue revealed that the mere exposure to contexts involving real
entities compared to fictional characters led to engagement of regions in the anterior medial prefrontal and posterior
cingulate cortices (amPFC, PCC). As these core regions of the brain’s default network are involved during self-referential
processing and autobiographical memory retrieval, it was hypothesized that real entities may be conceptually coded as
being more personally relevant to us than fictional characters.
Methodology/Principal Findings: In the present functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study, we directly test the
hypothesis that entity-associated personal relevance is the critical factor underlying the differential engagement of these
brain regions by comparing the brain’s response when processing contexts involving family or friends (high relevance),
famous people (medium relevance), or fictional characters (low relevance). In line with predictions, a gradient pattern of
activation was observed such that higher entity-associated personal relevance was associated with stronger activation in
the amPFC and the PCC.
Conclusions/Significance: The results of the study have several important implications. Firstly, they provide informed
grounds for characterizing the dynamics of reality-fiction distinction. Secondly, they provide further insights into the
functions of the amPFC and the PCC. Thirdly, in view of the current debate related to the functional relevance and specificity
of brain’s default network, they reveal a novel approach by which the functions of this network can be further explored.
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Introduction
One rarely comes across a person who does not enjoy engaging
in fictional worlds via mediums such as television, books, computer
games and pretend play. Imparting social knowledge and
achieving empathic growth are some of the reasons why we
universally engage in such forms of recreation which involve
simulations of alternate realities from a safe vantage point [1,2]. It
is therefore fascinating that we rarely confuse fiction with reality
although we can be intensely engaged in fictional worlds. Indeed,
by the age of five, children already possess an intricate
understanding of the reality-fiction distinction [3,4]. Understand-
ing the divide between reality and the more broadly construed
realm of fantasy has for long been a subject of exploration in the
field of developmental psychology [3,4]. There are a several
avenues therein that are broadly relevant to the current study such
as the principles that guide the formation of fictional world
knowledge [5], factors that enable categorization of reality-fantasy
phenomena [6], and intervening variables in the understanding of
the reality-fiction distinction, such as the influence of emotion and
relatedness of the fictional events to real life [4,7]. What have yet
to be fully uncovered are the factors that modulate our implicit
knowledge of the distinction between what is real and unreal.
In the first attempt to tackle this issue using functional magnetic
resonance imaging (fMRI), we aimed to uncover which brain
regions were preferentially engaged when processing either real or
fictional scenarios [8]. The findings demonstrated that processing
contexts containing real people (e.g., George Bush) compared to
contexts containing fictional characters (e.g., Cinderella) led to
activations in the anterior medial prefrontal cortex (amPFC) and
the posterior cingulate cortex (PCC).
These findings were intriguing for two reasons. First, the
identified brain areas have been previously implicated in self-
referential thinking and autobiographical memory retrieval [9,10].
This suggested that information about real people, in contrast to
fictional characters, may be coded in a manner that leads to the
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 1 March 2009 | Volume 4 | Issue 3 | e4741triggering of automatic self-referential and autobiographical
processing. This led to the hypothesis that information about real
people may be coded in more personally relevant terms than that
of fictional characters. We do, after all, occupy a common social
world and have a wider range of associations in relation to famous
people. These may be spontaneously triggered and processed
further when reading about them. A logical extension of this
premise would be that explicitly self-relevant information should
therefore elicit such processing to an even greater extent.
Indirect support for this idea comes from other studies which
have, for instance, demonstrated the engagement of the PCC
when viewing social interactions between real people relative to
identical scenarios performed by animated agents [11] as well as
when participants played interactive games against human
partners relative to computer partners [12]. Moreover, anterior
mPFC and the PCC have also been reported when recalling real
events relative to imagining fictitious events [13]. Even in the field
of social perception where differences in the level of agent realism
(e.g., humans versus robots) have received attention [e.g., 14,15],
familiarity effects have been reported in mPFC and PCC regions
as a function of viewing highly familiar faces relative to less
familiar faces [16].
Second, the amPFC and PCC are also considered to constitute
coreregions of the ‘‘default network’’ of the brain[17]. This network
refers to a group of brain regions that are customarily more engaged
during passive periods within experiments, such as at rest or when
performing cognitively undemanding tasks compared to highly
demanding tasks [17,18]. Assessments of the thought content during
such passive periods have revealed a preponderance of reflections
concerning past events, planning of future events and self-referential
mentation [19,20]. This observation fits well with findings showing
stronger activations in these regions during tasks that actively
necessitate such operations [21–26].
The aforementioned finding of activity in default network
regions being modulated by the type of semantic representation
(real.fictional) [8] hinted at a means by which passive and active
approaches to study the functional significance of the default
network could be integrated within one paradigm. This could be
optimally executed by contrasting contexts that are comparable in
terms of task demands but different in that one context contains
information that is more likely to spontaneously trigger active
internally-directed mentation. A good candidate for such a trigger
is self-relevant information as there is evidence to indicate that our
attentional system is particularly sensitive to self-relevant stimuli,
and that such stimuli automatically induce mind wandering [27].
By comparing the processing of high, medium and low personal
relevance contexts, two expectations could be verified. First, in the
context of the reality-fiction distinction, we predicted that
associated personal relevance represents a critical factor that
modulates automatic engagement of the amPFC and PCC. In line
with this, we expected a gradient activation profile in these regions
such that they would be most strongly engaged during high
relevance contexts (e.g., involving one’s mother), moderately
engaged in medium relevance contexts (e.g., involving George
Bush) and least engaged in low relevance contexts (e.g., involving
Cinderella). Second, in the context of the default network, such a
modulation would be evidence of a novel approach by which the
responsiveness of default network could be indirectly manipulated.
We investigated these questions using event-related fMRI where
the experimental design involved having participants read and
judge scenarios in which a real protagonist is involved in
imaginative or interactive contexts together with either a fictional
character (low relevance), a real person who is famous (medium
relevance), or a real person who was a friend or family member of
the participant (high relevance) (Figure 1).
The present findings confirm that the amPFC and the PCC are
modulated by the degree of stimulus associated personal relevance.
In addition, the results suggest that the current approach is
promising with regard to targeting the responsiveness of the
default network.
Results and Discussion
Behavioral results
In order to determine the behavioral comparability between the
different conditions, three behavioral indices were recorded. Two
indices (Reaction time, Response Accuracy) were collected over
the course of the experiment and one index (Perceived Difficulty)
was assessed in the post-fMRI feedback session. Figure 2 and
Table S1 of the Supporting Information (SI) show the findings
associated with the behavioral measures. Only the immediately
relevant behavioral findings are reported here. For further details,
please refer to the Supporting Results S1 in the SI.
With regard to reaction time (RT), the type of entity to be
processed was found to play a significant role (Repeated Measures
ANOVA: F2, 17=109.44, P,.001; partial-eta squared/hp
2=0.899),
such that participants were slower when responding to scenarios
involving fictional characters compared to those involving famous
entities (F1, 18=107.75, P,.001, hp
2=0.857) and friend entities
(F1, 18=160.53, P,.001, hp
2=0.899). In contrast, the RTs for
scenarios involving famous and friend entities were comparable
(F1, 18=3.82, P..05). Furthermore, compared to the control
condition, participants responded faster to all friend and famous
conditions (Paired samples t-test: all t18.24.18, all P,.005). The
differences between the control condition and the fiction
conditions were, however, non-significant (all P..05).
The type of entity also had a comparable effect on response
accuracy (Repeated Measures ANOVA: F2, 17=23.80, P,.001;
hp
2=0.569) such that response accuracy was lower when
responding to scenarios involving fictional characters compared
to famous (F1, 18=22.03, P,.001, hp
2=0.55) and friend entities
(F1, 18=29.16, P,.001, hp
2=0.618). In contrast, there was no
significant difference between the response accuracy of famous
and friend scenarios (F1, 18=2.4, P..05). Also, compared to the
control condition, participants responded more accurately to all
friend and famous conditions (Paired samples t-test: all t18.2.9, all
P,.01). The differences between the control condition and the
fiction conditions, however, were non-significant (all P..05).
A similar pattern of findings was also found on the measure of
Perceived Difficulty. Higher perceived difficulty was associated with
the fiction conditions compared to the friend and famous conditions,
(Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test:a l lZ.2, all P,.05). The friend and
famous conditions were, in contrast, not significantly differentiable
from one another (all P..05). Also, relative to the control condition,
perceived difficulty was lower for all experimental conditions (all
Z.2.6, all P,.01) except the fiction-interactive condition (P..05).
In summary, the statistical analyses of all the behavioral
measures indicate that the fiction and control conditions were
comparable as lengthier RTs, lower PCR and higher perceived
difficulty were associated with these conditions relative to the
friend and famous conditions. The friend and famous conditions
were comparable as they did not significantly differ on any of the
behavioral measures.
fMRI results
While no region of the brain was found to be significantly
engaged as a function of context type (Interactive versus
Reality and Personal Relevance
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character to be processed led to the differential engagement of
core regions of the default mode network [17], such as the amPFC
and PCC, as well as the hippocampal formation, lateral temporal
cortex, and dorsal medial prefrontal cortex (Tables S2, S3 and S4
in SI).
In particular, in line with our predictions, regions in and near
the amPFC (including the ventral mPFC) and PCC (including the
retrosplenial cortex) were modulated by the degree of personal
relevance associated with the presented entities (Figure 3). These
regions were most strongly engaged when processing high personal
relevance contexts (friend-real), secondarily for medium relevance
contexts (famous-real) and least of all in the low personal relevance
contexts (fiction) (high relevance.medium relevance.low rele-
vance).
The amPFC and PCC regions are known to be commonly
engaged during autobiographical and episodic memory retrieval
[10,28,29] as wellasduring self-referential processing [9].Regarding
their specific roles, there is evidence indicating that amPFC is
comparatively more selective for self-referential processing whereas
the PCC/RSC is more selective for episodic memory retrieval [25].
The results of the present study contribute to the understanding of
processesimplementedintheseregionsbyshowingthatthedemands
on autobiographical retrieval processes and self-referential menta-
tion are affected by the degree of personal relevance associated with
a processed scenario. It should additionally be noted that the
extension of the activations in anterior and ventral PFC regions into
subgenual cingulate areas (Figure 3) indicates that the degree of
personal relevance also modulated responsiveness in affective or
emotional regions of the brain [30].
Different activation profiles were associated with other core
regions of the default network, such as the dorsal medial prefrontal
cortex (dmPFC), the middle temporal gyri (MTG) and the
hippocampal formation. The dmPFC and the bilateral lateral
MTG were engaged only in high personal relevance scenarios
relative to both medium and low personal relevance scenarios
(high relevance.medium relevance,low relevance) (Tables S3
and S4 in SI). Dorsal and ventral regions of the mPFC (Figure 3)
have been proposed to subserve different top-down systems in self-
relevance appraisal [31,32]. The ventral system is postulated to
mediate the ‘‘identification and appraisal of stimulus-induced self-
relevance’’, which fits with current findings in the ventral/amPFC
regions [31]. In contrast, the dorsal system, which is known to be
involved in inference processing [33], is held to mediate ‘‘cognitive
control in the generation of explicitly self-referential decisions’’
[31]. This would imply that control processes, such as evaluation,
introspection and recollection arising from associative brainstorm-
ing, are additionally and selectively involved when processing
contexts involving friends or family.
The lateral MTG (Figure 4), on the other hand, is held to
underlie representations of semantic details associated with
recollected autobiographical knowledge [10]. That this region is
most strongly engaged when processing friend scenarios is fitting
given that we undoubtedly have a wider extent of autobiographical
semantic knowledge concerning our friends and family compared
to famous people or fictional characters.
Regions in the bilateral hippocampal formation (Figure 4), in
contrast, were equivalently engaged during high and medium
personal relevance contexts. Furthermore, these regions were
more strongly activated during both high and medium personal
Figure 1. Experimental Task and Design. (a) Examples of scenarios, cues and correct responses to cues for all conditions. (b) A schematic
representation of the sequence of events in a trial (trial length: 8 s). Across all experimental conditions, each trial began with a fixation cross
(duration: 500 ms) which was followed by the presentation of single sentence for 2000 ms where a scenario was introduced. Following a delay
(500 ms), a question cue was presented, to which the participant was required to respond. The cue remained on the computer screen for 1000 ms
and the subject responded (yes or no) by pressing the appropriate button (index or middle finger) on a response box placed under the right hand.
Variable jitter times were inserted before and after the scenario to enhance the temporal resolution of the blood oxygenation level-dependent
(BOLD) signal. For the baseline rest period, a blank screen was presented for the duration of a trial.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0004741.g001
Reality and Personal Relevance
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 3 March 2009 | Volume 4 | Issue 3 | e4741relevance contexts compared to low personal relevance contexts
(high relevance,medium relevance.low relevance) (Figure 4,
Table S2 and S3 in SI). The hippocampal formation is known to
be involved in the encoding, retention and retrieval of episodic or
event memories [34–36]. The recruitment of these regions in the
present context may thus reflect the processing of information that
is generally more salient in one’s daily life as the high and medium
relevance entities are likely to be associated with a greater extent of
immediately accessible episodic memories.
It should be noted that the experimental design was such that
correct answers for the four friend-real and famous-real conditions
were the same across context types (Fig 1A: Possible? - Yes;
Impossible? - No). The two fiction conditions differed in this
respect as the fiction-interactive condition was the only experi-
mental condition in which the correct responses were the other
way round (Fig 1A: Possible? - No; Impossible? - Yes). The lower
task conflict associated with the real conditions relative to the
fiction conditions may therefore be another factor that contributed
to the differences that surfaced when comparing the real
conditions to the fiction conditions. This issue however does not
affect the comparison between high relevance (friend) versus
medium relevance (famous) real entities.
Wider implications of findings
Thatcoreregionsof the brain’sdefaultnetworkare spontaneously
modulated by the degree of stimulus-associated personal relevance is
a consequential finding for two reasons. Firstly, the findings suggest
that one of the factors that guide our implicit knowledge of what is
real and unreal is the degree of coded personal relevance associated
with a particular entity/character representation.
How is this operationalized? Our proposal is that when we
encounter information concerning an entity/character, the
conceptual knowledge that we possess in relation to this person
is spontaneously activated. Our conceptual knowledge in relation
to real people is far more extensive and multifaceted compared to
that of fictional entities. For instance, the kind of associations most
people have for a fictional character such as Cinderella (evil
stepfamily, glass slipper, fairy godmother, the handsome prince,
midnight, etc.) are limited to the context of the story in which we
learnt about her. In comparison, our associations about a real
famous entity such as George Bush is far more wide-ranging (his
appearance, his position in the social hierarchy, my personal
feelings towards him, my knowledge regarding the feelings of
others towards him, his politics, his team, his family, the degree of
influence he has on my life, the last time I saw him on TV, etc.).
Our associations for people we know personally are even broader
and richer than that for famous people.
The engagement of the amPFC and the PCC as a function of
personal relevance reflects the retrieval, coordination and
integration of such multidimensional and relationally complex
information. These include autobiographical, episodic and self-
referential information which are automatically accessed with the
introduction of a familiar entity. The more relevant the person is
to oneself, the wider the range of stored information associated
with that person and, consequently, the greater the amount of
information that is automatically retrieved and integrated when
presented with appropriate stimuli [8].
What this might translate to at a phenomenological level is that
a real person feels more ‘‘real’’ to us than a fictional character
because we automatically have access to far more comprehensive
and multi-flavored conceptual knowledge in relation to the real
people than fictional characters. This would also explain why a
real person we know personally (a friend) feels more real to us than
a real person who we do not know personally (George Bush).
Indeed, there is evidence from developmental psychology that
even children tend to evaluate the factual nature of fictional stories
based on how the events therein fit with their own world knowledge.
For instance, parents reported that their 4-year old children consider
fictional characters that are associated with specific regular events in
one’s life, such as Santa Claus, the Easter Bunny and the Tooth
Fairy, to be more real than fictional characters that are not related to
real-life events, such as dragons, fairies and monsters [37]. It has also
been shown that children use contextual information when making a
decision about the reality status of a novel entity [38]. For instance,
5-year-olds judge novel entities to be real more often when they
encounter them in real everyday or scientific contexts compared to
fantastical contexts. Such findings indicate the modulatory role of
factors such as our personal experience in understanding the
distinction between reality and fiction.
With respect to the generalizability of the findings, it is
important to note that personal relevance may not be unequiv-
ocally associated with what is real (relative to what is unreal). After
all, fictional realms can also be associated with a high degree of
personal relevance in certain contexts, such as in chronic
Figure 2. Behavioral Findings. The graphs display the results
associated with each of the behavioral measures: reaction time (in
milliseconds, top panel), response accuracy (in percentage of correct
responses, middle panel) and perceived difficulty (in feedback ratings,
bottom panel).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0004741.g002
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PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 4 March 2009 | Volume 4 | Issue 3 | e4741Figure 4. Other Relevance Patterns. Each column shows activations resulting from the indicated contrast. The left column shows results from the
Friend.Famous contrast (inclusive mask: Friend.Control), the middle column shows results from the Friend.Fiction contrast (inclusive mask:
Friend.Control) and the right column shows results from the Famous.Fiction contrast (inclusive mask: Famous.Control). All reported activations
were corrected for multiple comparisons (p,.05) by employing cluster-size thresholding using Monte-Carlo simulations (initial height threshold:
z=3.09). The top row shows the activation profile in the left lateral temporal gyri whereas the bottom row depicts the activation profile in the
bilateral hippocampal formation across contrasts.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0004741.g004
Figure 3. Gradient Relevance Pattern. The top panel shows activations in and around the anterior mPFC and the PCC (x=23) as a function of
the indicated contrast. The left top panel shows the Friend.Famous contrast (inclusive mask: Friend.Control), the middle top panel shows the
Friend.Fiction contrast (inclusive mask: Friend.Control) and the right top panel shows the Famous.Fiction contrast (inclusive mask:
Famous.Control). All reported activations were corrected for multiple comparisons (p,.05) by employing cluster-size thresholding using Monte-
Carlo simulations (initial height threshold: z=3.09). Note that activations along the frontomedian wall extend into the dorsal medial PFC only in the
Friend.Famous and Friend.Fiction contrasts. The bottom panel shows the averaged percentage signal change (PSC) response associated with all
conditions within a peak voxel and its 26 adjacent neighboring voxels in the anterior medial prefrontal cortex (peak voxel: 25, 49, 0) (left bottom
panel) and PCC (peak voxel: 25, 256, 30) (right bottom panel). The zero point in the graphs represents the resting baseline.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0004741.g003
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that under certain circumstances a fictional entity of high personal
relevance (e.g., a ‘‘World of Warcraft’’ character to a chronic
gamer) could yield greater activation than a real famous person of
low personal relevance (for instance, a famous talk show host to the
same person). We believe that such situations in which the
phenomenological aspect of the reality-fiction line is somewhat
blurred provide rich ground for further investigation.
An additional point to keep in mind is that the concept of
‘‘personal relevance’’ may not be entirely synonymous with that of
‘‘self relevance’’. The customary use of the word ‘‘self’’ indicates a
direct link to one’s self concept – knowledge of one’s abilities and
skills, one’s personality attributes, etc. The object in question in
such cases is the ‘‘Self’’ or the ‘‘I’’ (for instance, ‘‘Does this word
describe you?’’ as opposed to ‘‘Does this word describe your
mother?’’ or ‘‘Does this word describe Cinderella?’’). We therefore
suggest that adopting the term ‘‘personal relevance’’ would be
necessary and fruitful for future work in this field because this term
more accurately captures the wider connotation of what is meant
by the phenomenon in question.
Secondly, given that we are predisposed to automatically attend
to and further process self relevant information [39–41], the
current results lend support to recent proposals that the default
network is activated when engaging in mental simulation or
‘‘imaginative constructions of hypothetical events or scenarios’’
[17]. What is particularly noteworthy is that differences in the
activation of this network in the present study were demonstrated
even when comparing conditions that were not significantly
different on any of the behavioral task measures (friend,famous,
Figure 2). This overrules the argument that the observed
differential activity within the default network is simply attribut-
able to low task load.
The overarching function of the default network is a matter of
some debate [19,42,43]. While some findings indicate that the
network is primarily recruited during task-irrelevant or ‘‘stimulus-
independent thought’’, there is evidence to suggest that this network
is also responsivewhen monitoring the external environment for task
relevant stimuli or during ‘‘stimulus-oriented thought’’. The current
findings argue against this dichotomy and suggest that a middle
ground is likely to be at play as we show that stimulus-dependent
information spontaneously triggered the default network beyond the
pure task context. In other words, as the personal relevance
associated with the stimulus was not task-relevant in the present
study, the findings speak for the stimulus-dependent triggering of
task-independent thought. This fits well with contemporary
proposals that highlight the anticipatory nature of the brain and
the default network’s role in this capacity by which associations,
analogies and predictions are automatically evoked about what is
likely to be relevant in a given situation when faced with novel input
[44,45].It isto benoted thatitisnot possible to fully exclude that the
current findings are relevant primarily for the individual brain
regions in question and not the network as a whole. However, co-
engagement of default network regions outside the mPFC and PCC
argue against this conclusion. As such then, the current findings
constitute evidence for a novel approach (by varying the semantic
context but not the demands of the task, as in the friend versus
famous comparisons) that holds much promise for further study of
the functional relevance of the default network.
Materials and Methods
Participants
The final sample included 19 right-handed healthy volunteers
(10 female; mean age: 24.58; age range: 21–30) with normal or
corrected-to-normal visual acuity. 2 participants were excluded
from the original pool of subjects due to poor behavioral
performance (less than 70% correct responses in one or more of
the conditions). The participants were native German speakers
with no reported history of neurological or psychiatric illness.
None of the participants were taking medication at the time of
measurement. All gave informed consent orally before participa-
tion.
Ethics Statement
The experimental standards were approved by the local ethics
committee of the University of Leipzig in Germany.
Experimental design
A3 62 repeated measures factorial design was employed with
40 trials per experimental condition. One factor was the character
type (friend-real, famous-real, fictional) and the second factor
reflected the context type (imaginative, interactive). The experi-
mental conditions together with a control condition (40 trials) and
20 resting baseline trials were presented in a randomized trial
design. With a trial length of 8 seconds and total of 300 trials, the
experimental session lasted 40 minutes. The participants were
given task instructions and performed a 5-minute practice session
on a laptop prior to the fMRI session. After the experiment, the
subjects were debriefed and requested to fill out a feedback form.
Experimental Task
Verbal one-sentence scenarios were presented in which a real
protagonist is involved in different contexts with a character that
was either a fictional character (e.g., Cinderella), a real person who
is world famous (e.g., George Bush) or a real person who was
either a friend or family of the participant (e.g., the participant’s
mother).
Participants were asked two weeks prior to the experiment to
submit a list of 11 names of their close friends and family. They
were also asked to read through a list containing names of 11
fictional characters and a list containing names of 11 famous
people, and to indicate whether they were familiar with all the
characters and people in the list. 10 names per list type (friend/
famous/fictional) were used as stimuli within the fMRI study. The
remaining 1 name per list was used as stimuli during the practice
trials.
The contexts were either Imaginative Contexts (dreamt about –
getra ¨umt von, thought about – gedacht an, remembered – erinnert an,
pondered about – nachgedacht u ¨ber) or Interactive Contexts (greeted
- gegru ¨ßt, dined with – gegessen mit, conversed with – unterhalten mit,
discussed with - diskutiert mit). The participants’ task was to evaluate
whether each scenario was possible or not (Figure 1) by
determining whether the event it portrayed could occur given
the physical reality of our world.
Within this framework it would be, for instance, possible that
someone thought about George Bush or Cinderella or the
participant’s mother. However, while it could be the case that
someone interacted with a real person such as George Bush or the
participant’s mother, it would be factually impossible that s/he
interacted with a fictional character such as Cinderella. To ensure
that participants would have to make an equal number of ‘‘yes’’
and ‘‘no’’ responses when making a decision, a question cue
(‘‘Possible?’’ or ‘‘Impossible?’’) was presented to the participants
after each scenario sentence to which they had to prepare the
appropriate ‘‘yes’’ or ‘‘no’’ response (Figure 1). For instance, if the
question cue ‘‘Possible?’’ followed the scenario ‘‘Someone spoke to
Cinderella yesterday’’, the correct response would involve pressing
the ‘‘no’’ button. If, instead, the question cue ‘‘Impossible?’’
Reality and Personal Relevance
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pressing the ‘‘yes’’ button.
In the control condition, participants made judgments concern-
ing the two response keys (Figure 1). During the course of the
experiment, the left button press was always used to indicate ‘‘yes’’
as an answer to the question cue and the right button press always
signaled a ‘‘no’’ response. In line with these response codes, the
control condition statements were devised to be either true (e.g.,
The ‘‘yes’’ button is the left button) or false (e.g., The ‘‘yes’’ button
is the right button). The trial events of the control conditions were
made comparable to the experimental conditions by having one of
two question cues (‘‘True?’’ or ‘‘False?’’) follow such statements to
which the participants were required to accurately respond. The
behavioral measures obtained for all 7 conditions included
reaction time (RT), percentage of correct responses (PCR) and
perceived difficulty. The latter was obtained during the post-fMRI
feedback session where subjects were asked to report how difficult
they perceived each of the conditions to be on a scale of 1–7 (1:
very easy, 7: very difficult).
During the feedback session, participants were asked to indicate
whether any of the famous people and fictional characters had any
special relevance for them (examples for such indications included
having collections of any sort in relation to any character or special
memories associated with any character). Only two participants
reported a special association for a fictional character. In addition,
just as in our previous study, participants were also asked to
indicate if they had interacted in the past with any of the famous
people in real life. Only one participant reported having interacted
with one of the famous entities. The pattern of findings remained
the same even when repeating the analyses after excluding all trials
involving this entity for this participant.
MRI scanning procedure
The imaging was carried out on a 3 T Bruker (Ettlingen,
Germany) Medspec 30/100 system, which was equipped with the
standard birdcage head coil. Participants were placed on the
scanner bed in a supine position with their right index and middle
fingers positioned on the appropriate response buttons of a 2-
button response box. The participants’ hands were carefully
stabilized and form-fitting cushions were used to prevent head,
arm and hand movements. Earplugs were also provided to the
participants so that scanner noise would be attenuated. The
sentences were presented using the VisuaStim Digital MRI Video
System (Resonance Technology, Northridge, USA), which is a
high-resolution visor (8006600 resolution) comprising of two small
TFT-screens placed close to the eyes.
24 axial slices (19.2 cm field of view; 64664 pixel matrix; 4 mm
thickness; 1 mm spacing; in-plane resolution of 363 mm) parallel
to bicommissural line (AC-PC) covering the whole brain were
acquired using a single-shot gradient echo-planar imaging (EPI)
sequence (TR=2000 ms; TE=30 ms; flip angle=90u; acquisition
bandwidth=100 kHz) sensitive to blood oxygenation level-
dependent contrast. Prior to the functional imaging, 24 anatomical
T1-weighted MDEFT images (data matrix=2566256;
TR=1300 ms; TI=650 ms TE=10 ms) with the same spatial
orientation as the functional data were acquired.
fMRI data analysis
The fMRI data were processed using the LIPSIA software
package [46], which contains tools for preprocessing, registration,
statistical evaluation and presentation of fMRI data. Functional
data were first motion-corrected using a matching metric based on
linear correlation. To correct for the temporal offset between the
slices acquired in one scan, a sinc-interpolation based on the
Nyquist-Shannon-Theorem was applied. Low-frequency signal
changes and baseline drifts were removed using a temporal
highpass filter with a cut-off frequency of 1/120 Hz. Spatial
smoothing was performed with a Gaussian filter of 5.65 mm
FWHM.
To align the functional data slices onto a three-dimensional
stereotactic coordinate reference system, a rigid linear registration
was performed with 6 degrees of freedom (3 rotational, 3
translational). The rotational and translational parameters were
acquired on the basis of the MDEFT [47,48] slices to achieve an
optimal match between these slices and the individual three-
dimensional reference data set. This high-resolution three-
dimensional reference data set was acquired for each subject
during a previous scanning session. The MDEFT volume data set
with 160 slices and 1 mm slice thickness was standardized to the
Talairach stereotactic space [49]. These rotational and transla-
tional parameters were subsequently normalized in that they were
transformed by linear scaling to a Talairach standard size. The
normalized parameters were then used to transform the functional
slices using trilinear interpolation so that the resulting functional
slices were aligned with the stereotactic coordinate system, thus
generating output data with a spatial resolution of 36363 mm (27
cubic mm).
The statistical evaluation was based on a least-squares
estimation using the general linear model for serially auto-
correlated observations [50,51]. The design matrix used for
modelling the data consisted of onset vectors for the correct trials
of each of the seven conditions (6 experimental, 1 control), with
additional vectors for empty trials and cued response periods
which included trial-by-trial RT as a parameter. The design
matrix was generated with a box-car function, convolved with
the hemodynamic response function. Brain activations were
analyzed in an event-related design, time-locked to the
presentation of the scenario of all presented trials. The model
equation, including the observation data, the design matrix, and
the error term, was convolved with a Gaussian kernel dispersion
of 4 sec FWHM to account for the temporal autocorrelation
[51]. In the following, contrast images or beta value estimates of
the raw-score differences between specified conditions were
generated for each participant. As all individual functional data
sets were aligned to the same stereotactic reference space, the
single-subject contrast images were entered into a second-level
random-effects analysis for each of the contrasts. One-sample t
tests were employed for the group analyses across the contrast
images of all subjects which indicated whether observed
differences between conditions were significantly distinct from
zero. t values were subsequently transformed into z scores.
Cluster-wise control of family-wise error corrections were
carried out to deal with the multiple comparison issue. Corrections
(P,0.05) were carried out using a combination of individual voxel
probability thresholding (Z=3.09) and minimum cluster-size
thresholding (999 cubic mm) as computed using Monte-Carlo
simulations [52,53].
Inclusive mask analyses were carried out from the corrected
one-sample t-tests. In each inclusive mask analysis, the statistic
parametric map of the random-effects analysis of the experimental
condition A-versus-control condition direct contrast was used as an
inclusive mask in the random-effects analysis of the experimental
condition A-versus-experimental condition B direct contrast. The
findings that result from an inclusive masked analysis indicate
which brain areas were significantly activated for experimental
condition A relative to experimental condition B, but only if the
same regions were also more highly activated in experimental
condition A relative to a control condition C.
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Table S1 Descriptive data (mean and standard deviation) of the
behavioral measures (RT: Reaction Time, PCR: Percentage of
correct responses, Perceived Difficulty) for all conditions: friend-
imaginative, friend-interactive, famous-imaginative, famous-inter-
active, fiction-imaginative, fiction-interactive, and control
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0004741.s002 (0.04 MB
DOC)
Table S2 List of activations from the Famous.Fiction inclusive
mask contrast (Mask: Famous.Control). Cluster-wise control of
family-wise error (p,0.05) was carried out to correct for multiple
comparisons.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0004741.s003 (0.04 MB
DOC)
Table S3 List of activations from the Friend.Fiction inclusive
mask contrast (Mask: Friend.Control). Cluster-wise control of
family-wise error (p,0.05) was carried out to correct for multiple
comparisons.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0004741.s004 (0.06 MB
DOC)
Table S4 List of activations from the Friend.Famous inclusive
mask contrast (Mask: Friend.Control). Cluster-wise control of
family-wise error (p,0.05) was carried out to correct for multiple
comparisons.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0004741.s005 (0.04 MB
DOC)
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